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Abstract 
In this thesis I aim to critically examine how the European Union (EU) liberal economic 
discourse towards Cuba is (re)produced and how the discourse enables policy actions. 
Furthermore, I aim to go beyond the question of how the liberal economic discourse enables 
policy actions. I will do so by asking how alternative policy actions are disabled through the 
discourse. This critical understanding of the (re)production of liberal economic discourse, 
enabling and disabling policies, aims to make it possible to question the dominant liberal 
economic development thinking. The research uses discourse analysis within a post structural 
approach, wishing to contribute to critical insights in the field of foreign policy discourse 
analysis. The analysis of the construction of the Self and the Other, through spatial, temporal 
and ethical dimensions, aims to shed light on the underlying taken for granted notions 
embedded in EU discourse. These taken for granted notions are understood to enable and limit 
policy actions. The goal of the thesis is to destabilize dominant liberal economic discourse 
and to open up room for plurality.           
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Introduction 
The tendency within the academic literature to analyse EU foreign policy towards Cuba 
through a positivist approach, asking why questions, triggered my attention. Asking a how 
question instead, enables me to problematize: ‘the possibility that particular policies and 
practices could happen’ (Doty 1996: 4, emphasis in the original). Apart from a focus on 
human rights and democratisation within EU discourse, the liberal economic ideas sparked 
my interest. While there are many different cases in which the EU employs liberal economic 
policy, Cuba is seen as one of the last remaining centrally planned economies, making it an 
interesting case to analyse. The development model the island has followed since the 
beginning of the revolution in 1959, makes it a case where the “reality” represented by the EU 
liberal economic development model does not always seem “natural”. Furthermore, Thomas 
Diez states that limiting of what is considered meaningful and logical through discourse, has 
not been studied sufficiently within the literature on EU foreign policy discourse (2014: 29). 
Therefore I aim to go beyond the analysis of how the liberal economic discourse enables 
policy actions, by asking how it disables alternatives (Larsen 2004: 68; Milliken 1999: 236). 
In the coming pages I will aim to answer the following research question: how does the EU 
(re)produced liberal economic discourse, and enables liberal economic policy actions while 
disabling alternative policy actions towards Cuba?   
  The EU liberal economic discourse is part of a bigger picture, that is present in many 
aspects of our everyday lives; academia, the media, Hollywood, universities and most 
importantly for this thesis, in development thinking. This discourse is based on liberal ideas 
ranging from the famous work of W.W. Rostow (1960) on the different stages economic 
growth takes and Francis Fukuyama (1989; 1992) with his emphasis on liberal democracy as 
the only option, to the advertising adds on television and the university courses on 
development economics (Escobar 1995: 79). This discourse brings with it certain taken for 
granted notions. That development can best be reached through capitalism and free market 
economy is an important taken for granted notion central in this thesis. I adopt a definition of 
taken for granted notions understood as the ideas that are not questioned, moreover, they are 
taken to be true, in the words of Foucault: ‘familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of 
thought….’ (1988: 154-155). The EU liberal economic policy can be seen as an example of 
the dominance of the liberal economic development model. Destabilizing the dominant 
discourse is important for dominance gives the ability to practice power (Doty 1996: 170). 
  The critical post structural perspective I take in this thesis fits the research question, it 
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follows from the unsettling question of how the worldview, in this case the view on Cuba by 
the EU, is made possible and shapes policy (Doty 1993: 304; Hansen 2006: 6). This critical 
questioning aims to reveal the construction of EU liberal economic policies, raising awareness 
of the mechanisms the discourse provides. It is important to note that it is not my intention to 
criticise capitalism or liberal economic reforms. However, I do aim to contribute to 
denaturalizing the dominant liberal economic development thinking. The research focuses on 
EU liberal economic discourse as part of EU’s foreign policy discourse towards Cuba. This 
choice to focus on one discourse strand within the overall foreign policy discourse of the EU 
towards Cuba means that I will look at the enabling of liberal economic policy actions and the 
disabling of alternative policies to those liberal economic policy actions. The main concepts, 
liberal economic discourse, are understood as follows: discourse is conceptualized as ‘a 
system of statements in which each individual statement makes sense’ (Doty 1993: 302). 
Liberal economy is defined as ‘emphasising the concept of the free market and laissez-faire 
policies, with the government's role limited to providing support services’ (Kariithi 2007: 72). 
Liberal economic discourse is therefore understood to be a system of statements in which the 
concepts of free market and laissez-faire politics with a limited role for the government is 
constructed as logical.      
  EU official documents compiled from 1995 to 2016, and texts that are referred to in 
the official EU documents for the basis of the discourse analysis. The timeframe of 1995 to 
2016 is chosen due to the importance of including several documents over a longer historical 
time to enable analysis of the (re)production of discourse (Hansen 2006: 70). It is important to 
note that while 1995 is taken as the starting point for the analysis, discursive practices are 
never static and build upon older already existing ideas on the topic, and at the same time 
create new meaning, hence the use of “(re)production” of the discourse (Larsen 2004: 66; 
Warnaar 2013: 6, 27).
1
 I am aware that the construction in the discourse will have changed 
over time. However, the aim of the thesis is to more generally critique the dominant discourse 
towards Cuba. The discourse is not only applicable to those years and the basic taken for 
granted notions continue at present. As the scholarly debate on discourses is on-going and the 
(re)production of discourse continues, I consciously use the present tense when writing about 
my findings.  
  To answer the research question stated above, first I will critically examine how the 
                                                          
1
 The discursive struggle within the EU (the influence of the different bodies and member states) is another 
interesting field of study. However, in this thesis the EU discourse is studied as a single discourse (Hansen 2006: 
67).   
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(re)production of the liberal economic discourse works. This is followed by the examination 
of the way policy actions are enabled and how alternative policy options to liberal economic 
policy actions are disabled. In the next chapter I will focus on the academic literature on EU 
foreign policy towards Cuba, the liberal economic discourse, and development thinking. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the theoretical poststructuralist approach and the methodology; 
discourse analysis. In chapters 3 the discourse analysis of the EU documents is presented. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the way the EU liberal economic discourse enables and disables policy 
actions. In the conclusions I will come back to the research question and briefly touch upon 
the possibilities for further research. 
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1. Literature review  
1.1. Debating EU foreign policy towards Cuba  
To the best of my knowledge, a research on EU discourse towards Cuba, has not been 
conducted before. However, a large body of literature exists on EU foreign policy towards 
Cuba. The scholarly work examined for this thesis on the EU-Cuba relation is mainly aimed 
at explaining EU foreign policy towards Cuba, through the analysis of important events that 
took place (Alzugaray Treto 2015; Baresch 2008; Byron 2000; Chofre-Sirvent and Antón-
Guardiola 2013; Contreras 2010; Domínguez et al. 2012; Gortázar et al 2004; Krull 2014; 
McKenna 2004; McGillion 2005; Ojeda Revah 2012; Perera Gómez 2012; Roy 2003, 2006, 
2012; Ugalde Zubiri 2010). In line with the academic debate on EU foreign policy, it is asked 
what the drivers of the EU are (strategic or value driven) (McKenna 2004; Krull 2014). An 
example is the argument about the objectives of EU foreign policy towards Cuba (Alzugaray 
Treto 2015; Ojeda Revah 2012: 24; Roy 2012; Ugalde Zubiri 2010: 170). Eduardo Perera 
Gómez, a Cuban based researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional – 
CIPI,
2
 describes the foundations on which the policy of the EU towards Cuba is based since 
the fall of the Soviet Union as follows: 
EU relations with the Island are a by-product of the restructuring of the international 
system after the breakdown of the Cold War equilibrium. The new context strengthened 
tendencies toward globalization structured around a fundamentalist model of liberal 
democracy and market economy (Perera Gómez 2012: 102).  
What he calls: ‘a fundamentalist model of liberal democracy and market economy’ (ibid), 
points towards the importance of the liberal notions used by the EU. The presence of a liberal 
economic discourse identified here is important for this research, however, the model of 
market economy is not elaborated upon, nor questioned in greater detail.   
  The academic debate on the aim of EU policy, and how to achieve it, leads not only to 
an identification of the liberal worldview on which this aim is build, it also provides some 
clues about the ideas of the EU on the need for Cuba to change. Joaquín Roy, one of the 
leading academic writers on EU-Cuba relations, describes the overall conclusions on EU 
policies as follows:  
 
                                                          
2
 Centre for Research of International Politics. 
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[t]he balance sheet of the experience of the European Union’s policies and attitudes on 
Cuba shows a mixed picture. It is composed of a coherent script of measures intended in 
the first place for maintaining the communication line open, and secondly for contributing 
to facilitate the conditions for a sort of “soft landing” in the terrain of democracy and 
market economy in the event of peaceful transition (2003:  26). 
A liberal model of democracy and market economy again stand out, however, also the idea of 
the need for transition. This aim for change, be it through the use of words such as regime 
change, transition, or progress, point towards the possibility for development. Perera Gómez, 
and Roy identify the aim for transition, however, how a developmentalist discourse, that 
enables policy actions, is constructed, is a question that remains unanswered (Perera Gómez 
2012: 103; Roy 2003: 26; 2012).     
  The unfolding academic debate on the EU-Cuba relations can be characterized by the 
evaluation and critique on the EU policy towards Cuba, and has mainly seen a problem 
solving, positivist approach. Even though the scholarly work on EU policy towards Cuba 
gives insight in the workings of the EU and the forming of policy, influenced by different 
voices and players in the field, they take the so called reality as a given. How the policy has 
been made possible in the first place, is not questioned (Warnaar 2013: 16). In the next 
section I will look at the academic literature on liberal economic discourse and development 
thinking.  
1.2. Liberal economic discourse and development   
In the influential work of Ian Manners, on the EU as a normative power, the liberal character 
of EU foreign policy is identified, however, in his work it is not analysed how it is 
discursively constructed (Diez 2005: 626; 2014: 36-38; Larsen 2004: 71; Manners 2002: 239, 
243; Rosamond 2014). Within EU foreign policy discourse studies, the idea that transition 
towards development is based on liberal values, has also come up (Larsen 2004: 73-74). 
Within dominant development thinking liberal ideas are present. The discursive practice of 
development thinking has its roots in the older colonizing discourse, which is most famously 
described by Edward Said in his work ‘Orientalism’ (ibid: 342; Said 1978). The binary 
oppositions used in the colonizing discourse were reframed after World War II, and 
institutionalised through the establishment of international institutions such as the United 
Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. From a post positivist approach, Arturo Escobar 
writes that: ‘[d]evelopment has been the primary mechanism through which the Third World 
has been imagine and imagined itself, thus marginalizing or precluding other ways of seeing 
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and doing’ (2005: 342). Within this mechanism of the development discourse, Roxanne Lynn 
Doty stresses that: ‘[f]oreign aid, as a set of productive representational practices, made 
possible new techniques within an overall economy of power in North-South relations’ (1996: 
128). The construction of needs plays an important role in development thinking. And again, 
the interpretation of needs within the dominant development discourse is based on liberal 
notions (Escobar 2005: 348).   
  One of the important aspects of liberal values is economic liberalism. Ben Rosamond 
describes economic liberalism as one of the EU foreign policy liberalisms (2014: 219). At the 
core he argues is the idea of propagation and spread of the market order (ibid). The liberal 
economic discourse uses economic ideas, going back to classical economic thinkers such as 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, based on capitalism and the working of a free market 
(Escobar 1995: 60). These ideas, now a days often called neoliberal, have been strengthened 
through the work of, amongst others, Rostow (1960) and Fukuyama (2006 [1992]), which has 
a huge influence both inside and outside academia. However, I agree with Rosamond’s 
argument, that the liberal economic discourse of the EU cannot be defined as neoliberal. 
Defining it as neoliberal would be a simplification of EU economic thought (ibid: 143).    
  Within the discourse, notions of free market economy as the best way for a 
government to reach growth and development are embedded (Karagiannis 2004: 3; Panizza 
2009). It is argued that: ‘the development construct has become a framework that rationalizes 
and naturalizes the power of advanced capitalism in progressivist terms – as the engine 
bringing those on the bottom “up” toward those who are already there’ (Cooper and Packard 
2005: 131). Within the framework of development, liberal economic notions are naturalized, 
constructing the North/South and developed/underdeveloped divides. The importance of 
opening up to the world economy through the liberalization of trade and investment and the 
modernization of the state are central to these liberal economic notions (Escobar 1995: 93-
94). In order to develop, progress towards a liberal economic model seems to be a given 
rather than a choice. Before analysing how this works in EU liberal economic discourse 
towards Cuba, in the next chapter the theoretical framework an methodology will be 
described.   
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2. Theoretical framework and methodology     
2.1. Poststructuralist approach  
In this research a critical theoretical approach is taken to better understand how liberal 
economic discourse is (re)produced, shaping policy in the act. Doty stresses that: ´[w]hat is 
explained is not why a particular outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and 
interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made 
possible´ (1993: 298, emphasis in original). A post-positivist approach therefore enables the 
questioning of the working of institutions and dominant taken for granted notions (Foucault, 
quoted in Rabinow 1984: 6). This questioning: ‘also has clear political and ethical 
significance, since in explaining discourse productivity, scholars can potentially denaturalize 
dominant forms of knowledge and expose to critical questioning the practices that they 
enable’ (Milliken 1999: 236). The questioning of the taken for granted notions, on which 
policy actions are based, makes it possible to: ‘denaturalize dominant forms of knowledge’ 
(ibid). The aim of applying a poststructuralist approach is therefore to destabilize: ‘dominant 
modes of making meaning’ (Doty 1996: 171; Springer 2012: 140).   
  The choice for a post-structural approach has theoretical implications. First of all, in 
its ontology, or how the world is seen, in which the importance of language in the creation of 
meaning and reality is stressed. The assumption that discourse frames first-order facts that 
shape policy action becomes possible through this ontological stance (Hansen 2006: 20). 
Instead of, for instance, asking why the relation between the EU and Cuba developed the way 
they have, from a poststructuralist perspective the question would be raised how certain 
policy actions have come about (Hansen 2006: 28; Warnaar 2013: 16). Secondly, in its 
epistemology, or how knowledge can be derived from the world, post-structuralism looks at 
the way worldviews are formed, putting effort in the interpretative understanding of the 
world. Within this poststructuralist approach, the understanding of the subjectivity of 
knowledge but also the subjectivity of my choices as a researcher is crucial (Aydın-Düzgit 
2014a: 357). The choices made in this research show I use a theoretical framework to make 
sense of the world around me. This critical epistemology is aiming to be self-reflective, by 
acknowledging that my worldview is also a construction and that I am providing an 
interpretation of how the EU liberal economic discourse (Doty 1993: 305). 
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2.2. Discourse analysis 
The choice for discourse analysis within a post structural perspective means that I assume that 
discourse gives meaning to the world, through the positioning of subjects and objects using 
different mechanism available in language (Doty 1993: 302; Larsen 2004: 63). Discourse 
gains meaning and policy actions are made possible through the construction of ‘particular 
subject identities, positioning these subjects vis-à-vis one another and thereby constructing a 
particular “reality”….’ (Doty 1993: 304-305). Diez puts it as follows: ‘the way in which 
discourse informs policy articulations works both through providing meanings on which one 
can build, and through setting the limits of a meaningful and legitimate policy’ (2014: 28). 
The limits of what is considered acceptable, means that the discursive practice also disables 
policy actions (Aydın-Düzgit 2014a: 355). Through the analysis of texts that are referred to 
within EU discourse, the way the dominant discourse disables alternatives can be studied. As 
Lene Hansen argues: ‘[o]fficial discourse should, however, be situated inside a larger 
intertextual web that traces intertextual references to other texts, thereby bringing in sources 
that are constructed either as supporting or as texts in need of repudiation’ (2006: 53). I agree 
with Doty when she states that: ‘I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives [to the 
dominant discourses] … [n]or do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned 
in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse’ (1996: 171). Thinking outside of the representation 
within EU liberal economic discourse, enables the destabilizing of the dominant EU liberal 
economic discourse and generates alternative sites of meaning (ibid: 170).  
  The elaborated methodological approach of discourse analysis, described in the work 
of Doty (1993), Milliken (1999), and Hansen (2006), is followed. Doty explains the analytical 
categories of presuppositions, predications, and subject positioning within the discourse that 
enable methodologically rigorous discourse analysis (1993: 306). The presuppositions consist 
of the knowledge that is taken for granted and construct: ‘a particular kind of world in which 
certain things are recognized as true’ (ibid: 306). Predications are employed in the work of 
Milliken, as the search for predicates; verbs, adverbs and adjectives that construct the objects 
and subjects within the discourse (1999: 232). Finally, subject positioning is a combination of 
the categories of predictions and presuppositions, focusing on the relationship between 
subjects, further elaborated in the work of Hansen through the use of the concepts of the Self 
and the Other (Doty 1993: 306; Hansen 2006). The construction of the Self and the Other is 
analysed using the three dimensions in discourse, spatial, temporal and ethical, described by 
Hansen (2006: 42). The first dimension is concerned with inclusion and exclusion through 
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space and the delineation of it (ibid: 42). The temporal dimension is defined by change or 
stasis over time, and is for instances relevant in discourses on development (ibid: 43). The last 
dimension deals with the construction of responsibility, the ethical dimension, and looks at 
how the Self or the Other is seen as responsible towards another (ibid: 45). The dimensions 
shed light on the way a discourse is (re)produced.    
2.3. Selection and analysis of the documents 
The choice for the method of discourse analysis has resulted in a thorough search for relevant 
documents. EU documents were compiled from 1995 to 2016. The EU database was 
consulted for documents on Cuba.
3
 Different EU documents on Cuba were added along the 
way, as one document often leads the researcher to another.
4
 Documents include amongst 
others; the Common Position (CP) written in 1996, several ‘Council conclusions on 
Evaluation of the EU CP on Cuba’ (2004; 2007; 2009), the ‘Country Strategy Paper and 
National Indicative Programme’ (2010), and the ‘Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 
for Cuba 2014-2020’ (2014). The European External Action Service (EEAS) website was 
consulted and various articles, press statements and declarations form part of the sources used 
in the thesis. The inclusion of documents from different years and EU bodies has been taken 
into account to provide a basis of official documents over time and from different EU bodies. 
Relevant external texts the selected EU documents refer to have also been included in the 
discourse analysis.   
  Practically the analysis of the EU official documents and some of the external 
documents that it refers to, consisted of the identification of the context of the different 
documents. Coding categories were established after which the texts were coded using 
different colours. Due to the interpretive character of the research, these coding categories 
changed somewhat during the analysis. The liberal economic discourse strand was selected 
for further analysis. The liberal economic discourse strands, were distilled from the discourse. 
The use of verbs, adverbs, adjectives, as well as the spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions 
were identified using different symbols. From there the focus was put on the interpretation of 
the use of words, the linguistic dimensions of the discourse. This empirical and interpretive 
driven research design lets the discourse speak for itself, the analysis and its outcomes have, 
                                                          
3
 Using the websites of the European Commission transparency document search: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=search&language=en and EUR – Lex: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/homepage.html amongst others.  
4
 See Chapter 4 of Hansen 2006 for more on intertextuality. 
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therefore, constantly nourished and altered the research to finally come to the understanding 
expressed in the thesis (Milliken 1999: 234).   
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3. The (re)production of liberal economic discourse 
3.1. Cuba: the isolated island   
The first formal relations between the then European Community (EC) and Cuba can be 
traced back to 1988, just before the Soviet Union disintegrated. As the EC established 
relations with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, diplomatic relations were 
initiated with Cuba (Perera Gómez 2012: 110; Gratius 2012: 122; Roy 2012: 118). The first 
important and larger document on Cuba, after the establishment of official diplomatic 
relations in 1988, was published by the Commission of the European Communities (1995). 
The communication of the Commission was followed by responses of the European 
Parliament in the same year and the Economic and Social Committee in 1996 (European 
Parliament 1995; European Economic and Social Committee 1996). In these documents, an 
overview is given of the situation on the island and its relations regionally and with the EU. 
The new global context, the end of the Cold War, is set as a possibility for political and 
economic change in Cuba, fitting within the ideas of economic development.  
  Positioning Cuba within EU policy has been a difficult task. In the Soviet era Cuba 
was approached as part of the Eastern European countries, whereas after the fall of the Soviet 
Union it has been spatially identified as part of Latin America or as one of the Caribbean 
islands that are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP) (Díaz 
Lazcano 2007: 260; De Miranda Perrondo 2003: 41; Gratius 2012: 121-122). In the three 
documents mentioned above, a universal discourse can be found in the articulation of the 
international community, constructing Cuba as failing to meet the international principles 
(Hansen 2006: 43). This enables subject positioning, through: ‘[t]he construction of subjects 
along the oppositional dimensions….’ (Doty 1993: 313). The Cuban economic model is, in a 
spatial sense, described as an outsider of the world economy, through the construction of the 
Cuban model as failed, old-fashioned and not efficient. It is important to note that 
independently of the developments as they were taking place in Cuba on the ground, the facts 
are given meaning within the discourse (Warnaar 2013). The Cuban economy is described as 
being a highly dependent economy, particularly dependent on sugar production, experiencing 
a terrible economic crisis, suffering severely from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
resulting in the serious deterioration of the living standards of the Cuban people (Commission 
of the European Communities 1995: 2; European Parliament 1995: 9, 12). The use of 
predicates, such as the adjectives and adverbs in italic in the example above, give meaning to 
the exclusion of the Cuban economic model from the “normal” liberal economic standard that 
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is followed by the international community.   
  The Cuban economic model is set against the liberal economic model that is 
constructed as being able to solve Cuba’s economic problems. This is particularly clear in the 
discourse on the economic reform process that was introduced by the Cuban government in 
1993. The description of the reforms fit within the ideas of economic development through 
the liberalization of the economy. In the text, the authorization of self-employment has 
yielded ‘significant results’, the opening up of agriculture sector to cooperatives has made it 
‘very much more efficient’, and attracting foreign capital in certain sectors of the economy is 
‘particularly noteworthy’ (European Economic and Social Committee 1996: 93-94, emphasis 
added). Later on in the reform process, Cuban state actions that went against liberal economic 
ideas, are constructed negatively: ‘[t]he Council expressed regret at the imposition of new 
restrictions on private enterprise since the last evaluation, with negative consequences for 
many Cuban people. It repeated its view that the opening of the Cuban economy would 
benefit all its people….’ (Council of the European Union 2004: 1). The negative 
representation of restricting liberal economic reforms reinforces the construction of opening 
of the economy as something positive. This spatial dimension, seen within a bigger context of 
development thinking enables the positioning of capitalism versus communism. This makes it 
possible to position capitalism as being able to bring countries to the same (economic) level as 
the Western countries (Hansen 2006: 42; Cooper and Packard 2005: 131). As will be 
described in the next section, this also counts for Cuba within EU discourse, in which it is 
given the capacity to develop towards a liberal economy.  
3.2. Cuba: the old-fashioned economy in need of modernization 
Within the development discourse in the official EU documents, the importance of the 
temporal dimension stands out. As Hansen highlights: ‘the construction of the Other as 
temporally progressing towards the (Western) Self is for instance a central component of 
development discourse….’ (2006: 43). The (re)production of the Self as more developed 
compared to the Other enables the taken for granted notion of the need for the Other to 
develop, desirably to become like the Self (Warnaar 2013: 25). In the discourse, integrating 
Cuba within the international community can be achieved through political and economic 
change. This constructs Cuba as being able to become like the Self: fully integrated into the 
international community. In the European Parliament response to the Commission this is 
stated as follows: ‘[the European Parliament] [b]elieves that dialogue is the most positive 
means of encouraging evolution in Cuba towards the achievement of those political and 
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economic changes which will enable the country fully to integrate itself into the international 
community’ (European Parliament 1995: 6, emphasis added). The word evolution in the 
statement of the European Parliament above, stresses the temporal dimension, in which the 
change of Cuba is constructed as a natural course of events.   
  Like the temporal positioning of ‘the Balkan’ in Hansen’s work, Cuba is constructed: 
‘as different from the West but with the capacity for liberal political and economic 
transformation’ (2006: 42). The encouragement of the EU of liberal economic reforms 
produces the capability of Cuba to temporally progress towards the liberal model of the EU. 
The process of transition is described as: ‘the adoption … of a series of economic reforms 
which, although inadequate and incomplete, at least go some way towards rationalization, the 
liberalization of economic ties with the world and the beginning of a private enterprise 
culture’ (Commission of the European Communities 1995: 3; emphasis added). This picture 
constitutes a temporal path, in which Cuba could and should move towards a liberal economy, 
towards the Self. It also stresses the development of the Cuban economy as insufficient and 
unaccomplished, through the use of the adjectives inadequate and incomplete. Through this 
positioning the discourse not only makes the Cuban economy look old-fashioned, it also 
presents an image of rationalization, liberalization and a private enterprise culture as desirable 
and modern. Ideas about modernization are at the core of development thinking, and also 
ingrained in EU liberal economic discourse. For example when it is stated that: ‘[t]he 
cooperation agreement should aim … to help bring the island’s economy up to date’ 
(European Economic and Social Committee 1996: 100).  
  The end of 1996 meant a new era in EU-Cuba relations. Arguably the key text in EU-
Cuba relations, the CP, was a response to the developments in Cuba. Amongst others the 
shooting down of two private plane of the exiled group Rescue Brothers by the Cuban 
authorities (Byron 2000: 32). It has also been argued that a changing mood within the EU has 
enabled the implementation of the CP (Gratius 2012).
5
 The CP conditioned a cooperation 
agreement with Cuba on democratization and improvements in the human rights situation, 
dominating the EU-Cuba relations for many years (Ojeda Revah 2012; Díaz Lezcano 2007: 
263).
6
 In the CP the EU states that: ‘[i]t is its firm wish to be Cuba’s partner in the progressive 
and irreversible opening of the Cuban economy’ (Council of the European Union 1996: 1). 
The adjective used to describe the reforms: tentative, indicates there is still a long way before 
a “real” liberal economy is established. The other adjectives used in the second sentence: 
                                                          
5
 Especially a change in Spanish politics under José Maria Aznar has been attributed to the change. 
6
 Until the signing of the PDCA in 2016 that repealed the CP.  
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progressive and irreversible, emphasise the temporal direction of the economic opening. The 
economic opening is progressing towards the Self and there is no way back. The 
presuppositions are made in the discourse that the opening of the Cuban economy is a 
progressive act, one that cannot be undone.  
  In the selected EU documents stretching from 1996 to 2008, the human rights and 
democratization discourse strands are dominant (Presidency of the European Union 2003; 
European Parliament 2004; Council of the European Union 2004; European Parliament 2006; 
Council of the European Union 2007). One exemption is the colourful document published 
after the EU established its Delegation in Havana on 14 February 2003. The document 
pictures Cuba as a beautiful old fashioned island, expressed through images of old buildings, 
a cow in front of a cart in the countryside, and the ever present old American cars. Cuba is 
portrayed as less developed, less modern and in need of a transition. The main message that 
stands out, and is literally highlighted in the text, is: ‘opening the door to the world economy’ 
(European Commission 2003: 5). With this sentence, Cuba’s capacity to become 
economically integrated into the world economy is reproduced. The writer of the document, 
Commissioner Poul Nielsen states that: ‘I have no doubt whatsoever that Cuba will over time 
integrate fully and successfully into this irreversible process of globalisation’ (ibid: 2, 
emphasis added). Through the usage of the adverbs and adjectives; fully, successfully and 
irreversible, the capacity of Cuba to move towards the Self is strengthened. At the same time, 
the spatial dimension of Cuba as outsider that is (still) not part of the modern, globalised 
world economy is reproduced.   
  When in 2003, just after the EU opened its Delegation in Havana, 75 dissidents were 
imprisoned in Cuba and for the first time in years three Cubans were executed following the 
hijacking of a ferry, the EU responded with restrictions on diplomatic relations and political 
measures (Contreras 2010: 10; Roy 2012: 124). The mentions made about the economic 
situation in Cuba in the selected documents in those years are mostly negative (Council of the 
European Union 2004: 1; 2007: 7; European Parliament 2008: 378). Within the context of 
stagnating EU-Cuba relations, the economic, together with the political situation, are 
described as ‘essentially unchanged’ (Council of the European Union 2007: 7; European 
Parliament 2008: 378). This constructs the pausing of Cuba on the temporal transition towards 
the Self. However, even though the focus of EU foreign policy shifted towards human rights 
and democratization, the need for economic transition and Cuba’s ability to change towards 
the Self remained (ibid; European Council 2007: 7; 2009: 11).   
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3.3. Cuba: EU’s responsibility  
Moral responsibility is implied in the EU discourse. The EU is portrayed as a responsible, 
moral actor in supporting Cuba to become part of the insiders club (the international 
community and world economy) (Hansen 2006: 45; Larsen 2004: 69). For example when the 
Commission of the European Communities states: ‘The purpose of this Communication is to 
show that a peaceful and successful transition to a market economy and political pluralism in 
Cuba requires the forging of new international and regional bonds, and that, by virtue of its 
very size, the EU is well placed to play a leading role in that process’ (1995: 2). The moral 
responsibility is sometimes stated literally: ‘[t]he European Union has a duty to the Cuban 
people to support its integration in the international system….’ (European Parliament 1995: 
15). The word duty used by the EU, frames the EU as an actor that has the responsibility to 
act in support of the integration in the international system. More subtly, it is also expressed 
in sentences such as: ‘[t]he EU should remain a reliable partner.…’ (European Commission 
2014: 4, emphasis added). The use of modalities, like the verb should, presupposes 
responsibility and adverbs such as reliable reinforces the moral character of the EU. The 
moral positioning is strengthened through the use of active and positive verbs in stressing how 
the EU will, for example: ‘help bind the island republic back into the international community’ 
(Commission of the European Communities 1995: 6). In all documents analysed, the EU 
structurally uses active positive verbs for itself, while active verbs for Cuba or the Cuban 
government are less present. Through the use of these positive and active verbs for the Self, 
the EU constructs an ethical identity enabling it to, for example; take action, support, help, 
encourage and train.  
  The EU looks at the responsibility not only as its own, but as a universal 
responsibility.
7
 Hansen states that: ‘[w]hen foreign policy discourse articulates an explicit 
international responsibility … a powerful discursive move is undertaken in that the issue is 
moved out of the realm of the strategic and ‘selfishly national’ and re-located within the 
‘higher grounds’ of the morally good’ (2006: 45). Within the liberal economic discourse this 
is manifested through the notion of raising the living standards of Cuban people (Council of 
the European Union 1996: 1). The responsibility of the EU towards the Cuban people is 
constructed within a liberal economic framework. The support of the liberal economic 
reforms is seen as a responsibility of the EU towards the Cuban people and their wellbeing 
                                                          
7
 This is especially clear within the discourse strand on human rights and democratization (European Parliament 
1995: 6; 2004; 2006; 2008; Hansen 2006: 45). 
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(Council of the European Union 2004: 1; European Union Action Service 2016b). The 
construction of international responsibility is especially present in the development thinking 
(Hansen 2006: 45). For example by referencing Article 21 of the Treaty of the European 
Union in the 2010 National Indicative Programme for Cuba:  
[t]his objective [eradicating poverty] has to be put into the context of the EU’s external 
action as a whole (see Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union), including 
sustainable development, integration of developing countries into the world economy, 
democracy, rule of law and human rights, preserving peace, preventing conflicts and 
strengthening international security’ in order to reduce and, in the long term, eradicate 
poverty (European Commission 2010: 7). 
The overarching development discourse implies humanitarian responsibility, and is used as a 
powerful discursive tool. The EUs ethical responsibility for the wellbeing of the Cuban people 
shapes the EU as a moral entity. Within a liberal economic framework, the EU constructs 
itself as morally responsible for the wellbeing of the Cuban people (Hansen 2006: 42).  
   When in 2014 the negotiations for the PDCA started, the seven rounds that took place 
were reported in more technical language (Council of the European Union 2014; European 
Union External Action Service 2014a, 2014b, 2015a/b/c/d). However, when the negotiations 
were concluded in 2016, the responsibility of the EU towards Cuba was expressed in the same 
context of development thinking (Council of the European Union 2016; European Union 
External Action Service 2016a, 2016c). Federica Mogherini stated at the Joint press 
conference: ‘I look forward to continuing our engagement with the view to supporting Cuba’s 
sustainable socio-economic development and ensuring better opportunities for all in Cuba’ 
(ibid 2016b). The notion that the EU has the moral responsibility to engage and support Cuba, 
the ethical dimension, is present in the EU discourse. Would there not be a construction of 
responsibility, the EU would not engage in development policies with Cuba. In the next 
chapter the enabling and disabling of policy actions will give insight in the way the 
(re)production of the EU liberal economic discourse shapes policy actions.  
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4. Enabling and disabling policy action 
4.1. Enabling liberal economic policies   
The construction of the Self and the Other, through the spatial, temporal, and ethical 
dimensions described in chapter 3, endorses certain taken for granted notions. Constituting 
Cuba as an outsider of the international community and the Cuban economic model as failed, 
makes it possible to think of Cuba as a country in need of economic change. Next, the idea 
that liberal economic development is the only way to develop is taken to be true. Within the 
EU worldview, liberal economic reforms can enable positive, progressive, and irreversible 
transformation. Therefore it is assumed that opening up the economy will benefit all Cuban 
people. Finally it is believed that the EU is morally responsible to support the increase in the 
living standards of the Cuban people. These taken for granted notions enable EU policy 
makers to design liberal economic policies towards Cuba. In what follows, I will focus on 
policies and policy actions that are related to the liberal economic discourse, within the 
development context.   
  The development cooperation that was started in the first years after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, is, amongst others, focused on liberal economic development. In 2003, 
development cooperation was cancelled by the Cuban governments, in answer to the 
diplomatic sanctions that the EU installed following the human rights crisis. After the 
sanctions were lifted in 2005, the EU development cooperation was resumed in 2008 (Perera 
Gómez 2012: 112-113; Alzugaray Treto 2014). The first extensive development plans were 
presented in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for the period 2011-2013, followed by 
the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for Cuba 2014-2020 (European Commission 
2010; 2014). The NIP focuses development cooperation to three priorities: food security, 
environment and adaptation to climate change and expertise exchanges, training and studies. 
In the MIP the focal sectors chosen are: food security and sustainable agriculture, 
environment and climate change and sustainable economic and social modernisation. Within 
the first priority and focal sector, the main support is provided to the modernisation of the 
agriculture sector, decentralisation, and increasing efficiency (Commission of the European 
Union 2010: 34-35; 2014: 10-11). However, it is especially the third focal sector of the MIP 
‘support to sustainable economic and social modernisation’ in which the liberal economic 
discourse is articulated. The three expected results of the third focal sector speak for 
themselves; 1. ‘Modernisation measures in the public administration and implementation’; 2. 
‘Financial and technical capacity and access to innovation for the private sector’; and 3. 
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‘Access to external markets (trade) and to foreign investment is improved’ (ibid: 18-19). 
These expected results fit within the discourse context of liberal economic development 
(Escobar 1995: 93-94). They rest on the taken for granted notions that the EU has the moral 
responsibility to support the increase in living standards. It is assumed that opening up the 
economy will enable this (European Commission 2003; Hansen 2006: 45). The assumptions 
made on Cuba’s needs, liberal economic development as the only option and EU’s moral 
responsibility, result in a “reality” in which the policies described in the NIP and the MIP are 
made possible and become real through policy actions.   
  An example of the policies becoming policy action is the project that trains: ‘business 
managers in the ways of a market economy.…’ which started in 1995 and remains part of the 
development programme for Cuba 2014-2020 (Commission of the European Communities 
1995: 7; European Commission 2014). The MIP states that:   
[t]o ensure success of this process [economic reform], it will be necessary to enhance the 
capacity of the relevant national authorities as well as other societal actors such as self-
employed, cooperatives and newly emerging small enterprises. They will need support in 
the formulation and implementation of modernisation measures and in reaping the new 
opportunities offered by the update of the economic model (e.g. new economic operators, 
strengthened local authorities) (European Commission 2014: 8). 
In the description of the development project above, Cuba’s need for enhanced capacity is 
combined with the responsibility and possibility of the EU to support what are called 
“modernisation measures”.8 The taken for granted notions enable the idea that the liberal 
economy’s ability, through economic reforms, will be successful (if the capacity of Cubans is 
increased through help from the EU). It is assumed that the programme for capacity building 
therefore creates new opportunities. The policy action is enabled through taken for granted 
notions; Cuba is in need of economic change, liberal economic reforms will enable successful 
economic change, and this will benefit all. Outside of the taken for granted notions on the 
liberal economy, the policy actions would not make sense, they would lack meaning.   
  The lens through which the EU imagines progress and development for Cuba has 
made possible the liberal economic policy actions. These ideas are present in a broader 
context of development thinking, that is dominant in the international institutions. This 
dominant discourse also works to disable alternative policy actions. In the next section I will 
                                                          
8
 These measures consisted of liberal economic reforms such as the decentralization of decision making, 
‘introducing elements of a market economy’ (European Commission 2014: 8).  
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describe how the (re)production of EU liberal economic discourse disables alternative policy 
actions to liberal economic ones. 
4.2. Marginalizing and precluding alternatives  
On the one hand, the liberal economic discourse works to enable policy actions that seem 
logical and meaningful (Milliken 1999: 229). On the other hand, the discourse of the EU 
disables other possibilities. ‘[D]iscourses are understood to work to define and to enable, and 
also to silence and to exclude … endorsing a certain common sense, but making other modes 
of categorizing and judging meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified’ 
(ibid). The taken for granted notions described in the section above, make alternative policy 
actions to liberal economic ones illogical and even hard to imagine. Because policy makers 
act within this worldview, they are: ‘not concerned with what was precluded, but acted 
according to what was made possible’ (Warnaar 2013: 176-177). The dominant discourse on 
liberal economic development and the taken for granted notions endorsed by it, disable 
alternative policy actions. In what follows, intertextuality is important. Those texts that are 
referred to in the selected EU documents, that are repudiated or reinterpreted, can shed light 
on the disabling of alternative policy actions.   
  In the CP for example, the construction of EU moral responsibility towards the Cuban 
people is constructed against immoral policy of the US. It is stated that: ‘[i]t has never been 
European Union policy to try to bring change by coercive measures with the effect of 
increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people’ (Council of the European Union 1996: 
1). The reference is indirectly, however, within the context of the discourse and other direct 
references to the US embargo and several other texts, the intertextual reference becomes clear 
(Hansen 2006: 53). This construction of moral responsibility disables policy actions such as 
harsh economic sanctions, as they go against the taken for granted notion of EU moral 
responsibility to the wellbeing of the Cuban people. However, this does not lead to disabling 
alternative policy actions to the liberal economic ones of the EU. Therefore I will turn to 
another important reference in the EU documents.  
  The liberal economic discourse displayed in the National and Multiannual Indivative 
Programme’s, the NIP and the MIP, can help understand how alternative policies to liberal 
economic ones are disabled. The NIP and MIP were written in accordance with Cuban 
development plans (European Commission 2010: 5; 2014: 5, 8; Partido Comunista de Cuba 
2011). The Cuban text that the EU documents refer to, is the ‘Lineamientos de la Política 
Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución’ or Guidelines of the economic and social 
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policy of the party and the revolution (Partido Comunista de Cuba 2011). In the Guidelines it 
is stated that the reforms will be taken within the socialist framework of property of the most 
important modes of production in the hands of ‘el pueblo’ (the people) (ibid: 5; 9).9 The 
reforms that are described, are often in line with the liberal economic reforms favoured by the 
EU. However, overall, the document is much more nuanced and focuses attention to the 
socialist character of the economic model. The intertextual reading of the document within 
EU discourse, however, tries to fit its meaning within EU liberal economic development 
thinking. The reinterpretation of the Cuban government document suit the taken for granted 
notions of the EU liberal economic discourse.  
  One of the examples of how the EU discourse fits an alternative to the liberal 
economic model within its own discourse, is the idea of cooperatives. The alternative concept 
revolves around cooperatives as a sustainable development alternative to development based 
on liberal principles and is an alternative interpretation that has also been put to work in Cuba 
(Díaz Duque 2013; Partido Comunista de Cuba 2011: 12). In this model, ownership and the 
means of production of businesses is places in the hands of the workers (PRI 2015). In the 
Guidelines, the cooperatives are describes as a socialist form of collective property (Partido 
Comunista de Cuba 2011: 12). The cooperatives are mentioned in the EU texts, however, they 
are constructed as part of the dominant framework, of liberal economic reforms (European 
Commission 2010: 22-23, 42; 2014: 8-9). For example by stating that:  
[a]t the core of this national priority lay processes of both transfer of the key role in food 
production from state-owned companies to cooperatives and individual producers, and 
decentralisation of the decision-making process for the production and distribution of 
foodstuffs from the central to the municipal level (European Commission 2010: 42). 
The cooperatives are positively constructed within the liberal economic idea of 
decentralisation of the economy and a limited role for the government (ibid). The possibility 
of the cooperatives being an alternative economic model is not taken into account (Escobar 
1995: 98). Even though the alternative interpretation still works within the same discourse 
practices of economic development, it is: ‘a challenge to the dominant framework’ (Escobar 
1995: 82). Especially because the discourse questions binary opposition such as communism 
(or socialism) versus capitalism, state versus private and social versus economic.  
  The EU liberal economic discourse disables alternatives policy actions to the liberal 
economic policy actions. The discourse does this through taken for granted notions that 
                                                          
9
 My own translation and interpretation.  
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preclude alternatives. On the ground of the construction of the Cuban need for economic 
change, the liberal economy being the answer for development, and that the opening up of the 
economy will benefit all Cubans, alternative readings are put outside of the limits of what is 
considered meaningful (Aydın-Düzgit 2014a: 355; Diez 2014: 28). However, as described in 
the section on discourse analysis in chapter 2, I do not believe that ‘we are always hopelessly 
imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse’ (Doty 1996: 171). Questioning taken 
for granted notions, that are endorsed in the EU discourse, makes it possible to create space 
for imagining alternatives. This room for alternative sites of meaning will enable a more 
plural discussion on development.  
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Conclusion 
I have aimed to show how the EU has (re)produced liberal economic discourse through the 
analysis of EU documents and external documents they refer to, over the period 1995 - 2016. 
I have argued that the EU (re)produces liberal economic discourse, through the use of a 
construction of Self-Other binary oppositions. These oppositions have been analysed through 
the spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions. In the EU discourse the Cuban economic model 
is characterized as negative, old fashioned and in need of transition, whereas the liberal 
economic model is presented as successful, modern and providing possibilities for economic 
growth. The description of Cuba as an outsider of the global economy, the spatial dimension, 
makes it possible to construct the need for integration into the global economy. This temporal 
dimension gives Cuba the capacity, from an EU point of view, to develop towards a liberal 
economy. This change can be achieved through the support, especially through development 
cooperation, of the EU to Cuba. This ethical dimension within the EU discourse, portrays the 
EU  as a moral responsible actor, in support of the liberal economic reform process that 
should lead to progress and better living conditions.   
  With the analysis of the (re)production of the liberal economic discourse, through the 
Self-Other construction within spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions, I have aimed to show 
how policy actions are made possible. The taken for granted notions that are endorsed by the 
liberal economic discourse have been argued to enable the framework in which liberal 
economic policy becomes possible. The construction of the need for economy change, liberal 
economic development as the only option for progress, and the notion that opening up the 
economy will benefit all Cubans, makes the crystallization of policy actions possible. The 
liberal economic model is used as a lens through which the EU sees the development of Cuba, 
in which the economy comes first and development will follow “naturally”. Within this 
context certain policy actions become logical and practicable, they fit in the framework 
created by the discourse.    
  The research has also aimed to address how alternative policy actions to liberal 
economic ones are disabled, which has, not been given sufficient attention in EU foreign 
policy discourse analysis so far (Diez 2014: 29; Aydın-Düzgit 2014a: 355). In the last section 
of chapter 4, I have argued that the liberal economic discourse not only enabled certain policy 
actions, it has also set limits to what is considered meaningful, practicable and adequate 
(Milliken 1999: 229; Diez 2014: 29). I have done so through the intertextual mechanism in 
which the EU documents reinterpret an important Cuban document. This is argued through 
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the example of the discourse on cooperatives, that has been fitted in the liberal economic 
discourse in EU texts, while it is seen as an alternative model in the Cuban government 
document. The idea of another possibility or system, is left out because it does not fit within 
the taken for granted notions endorsed through the discourse. As the discourse on liberal 
economy of the EU has become so entrenched, it becomes difficult to think outside of it. This 
thesis therefore has aimed to destabilize the dominant discourse on development that is 
dependent on a liberal economic model by critically examining the policy actions that the 
liberal economic discourse enables. The destabilizing of a dominant discourse, such as the EU 
liberal economic discourse, is important as it aims to reveal the practices of domination that it 
enables.   
  Acknowledging the delimitations made in this thesis, due to research choices en 
restricted time and space, the results lead to possible and more extensive further research. The 
other important discourse strands on human rights and democratization and the existing 
alternative discourses on these issues could be included. The foreign policy discourse of the 
Cuban government and its ability to produce a counter narrative, that might seem irrational in 
the eyes of the EU, needs further research. A relevant addition would be to go beyond the 
official government discourses and include alternative discourses to the EU liberal discourse 
(outside of the documents referred to in EU discourse) to better understand the way the 
discourses work and how the dominant discourse can be destabilized. Within a broader 
context, the discourse of international institutions, such as the international financial 
institutions, would enable a more generalized critique on the dominant development 
discourse. Finally, how these policy actions also (re)enforce and feed back into the dominant 
discourse is another important question that needs further study.  
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